Following several years of tension between Europe
and the United States, policymakers on both sides
of the Atlantic have rediscovered pragmatism.
Apparently irreconcilable differences of values are
giving way to new forms of practical cooperation.
However, the new transatlantic relationship differs
from the old one in some very important ways.
New issues that involve access to various forms
of security-sensitive economic information are
becoming increasingly prominent. These issues,
however, do not fit neatly into the traditional
boxes of the transatlantic relationship. On the
one hand, they touch directly on important and
sensitive matters of national security. On the
other hand, they involve a much wider variety of
actors than traditional security issues ever did.
The European Union and the United States have
sought to resolve their differences over these
issues in new ways, opting for decentralized and
often ad-hoc forms of cooperation that build
upon existing relationships in the security realm.
None of this has been planned. Policy actors and
negotiators, as is nearly always the case, have
had to respond to immediate and compelling
needs, without having the luxury to think
through the long-term implications of the issues,
the new range of actors who are involved in
the debates, or the long-term appropriateness
of the ad-hoc institutional structures that are
being created. This is by no means necessarily
a bad thing; when dealing with new issues
that have uncertain long-term implications,
it is rarely a good idea to construct grand
strategies or new institutions from scratch.
However, since it is now becoming clear that
we are likely to face many new issues in the
future that do not fit neatly under the rubrics of
security or economics and that involve a wide
range of non-traditional actors, it is timely to
discuss whether there might be more appropriate
approaches than those that are currently favored.
In particular, should we deal with new issues that combine both security and economic concerns
in isolation from each other as they emerge—one
after the other? Or should we try to create a
common toolset that can help us anticipate these
issues and prevent them from creating crises?
This paper argues for the latter approach. Rather
than treating issues such as airline passenger
information or financial transfer data as matters
for traditional international security cooperation,
policymakers in the European Union and the
United States should look to models from economic
cooperation (the Safe Harbor arrangement)1 to
domestic accountability for security structures
(the U.S. Congressional system of oversight
for intelligence agencies). Such an approach
would shift the regulatory center of gravity
away from controversy-driven negotiation
toward semi-routinized problem solving, with
clear lines of communication, authority, and
accountability. This would not only allow the
security aspects of these issues to be handled
better; it would mitigate the considerable risks
of disruption that the transatlantic economic
relationship faces under the current approach,
which addresses potential controversies only
when they threaten to become public scandals.
The first part of this paper outlines the
underlying problem and describes two recent
controversies that provide practical and concrete
illustration of the broader issues that are at
stake. The second part discusses structures
that would provide increased oversight and
communication between the European Union
and the United States over these emerging issues.
It advocates an approach that would combine
more coherent and centralized policy decision-
making with a greater degree of accountability
and continued flexibility in implementation.